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BOOK REVIEW 
SUSAN M. BEHUNIAK, A CARING JURISPRUDENCE: LIS-
TENING TO PATIENTS AT THE SUPREME COURT, LAN-
HAM: ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. 1999. 
PP. V - 192. (ISBN 0-8476-9455-0) 
Lady Justice sits blindfolded, a familiar figure, balancing 
the scales of justice in one hand, and wielding the sword of 
authority in the other. Instead of sitting alone in her delibera-
tions, however, the Angel of Mercy stands behind her, with 
wings spread wide, as she whispers words of compassion in 
Lady Justice's ear. This image, depicted in the cover art and 
enlivened within the text of Susan M. Behuniak's A Caring Ju-
risprudence, provides the overriding symbol of Behuniak's 
scholarly and articulate challenges to the traditional American 
legal system. 
Through clear, methodical analysis, Behuniak imagines for 
us all a jurisprudence that wholly integrates our traditional 
ethic of justice with an ethic of care, encouraging judges to use 
mercy and compassion as guides in considering the more per-
sonal and emotional issues brought before them. Applying her 
theories to well known United States Supreme Court decisions 
involving abortion and physician assisted suicide, Behuniak 
first gives a detailed critique of the shortcomings inherent in 
the mainstream ideal of justice at work in these crucial opin-
ions. She establishes the ways in which justice has been tradi-
tionally understood to require impartial, reasoned and univer-
sally applied decision-making. Behuniak then proposes a 
model of justice that integrates compassion and mercy as nec-
essary parallels to reason and blind impartiality. She illus-
trates her proposal by revisiting the cases, this time focusing 
on the patients themselves in order to show what a more caring 
jurisprudence might look like in practice. 
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A Caring Jurisprudence begins with a comparison of legal 
and medical knowledge, which is significant because abortion 
and physician assisted suicide are clearly medically based is-
sues. Behuniak explains how, from the beginning of a legal or 
medical education, students are taught to distrust the emo-
tional, and to leave personal feelings behind in favor of trained, 
analytic reasoning. She aptly describes the way in which tradi-
tional medical training fails to recognize patients as people 
with particular knowledge about their own conditions. Rather, 
the medical profession tends to treat patients as "cases with 
symptoms" (9) so that a person with a condition such as bowel 
cancer becomes the condition itself, and may be referred to 
simply as "the bowel cancer" (6). 
According to Behuniak, legal knowledge is also limited in 
significant ways. First, the adversarial nature of our legal sys-
tem requires us to focus on the dispute and to define legal is-
sues in binary terms, overlooking the possibility of compromise 
or recognition that there may be more than two sides to an is-
sue (17). Second, the structure of legal reasoning and the re-
quired terminology of "legalese" fail to allow for the expression 
of personal feelings and stories. As Behuniak explains, when a 
legal issue is framed around a personal hardship such as an 
unwanted pregnancy or terminal illness, the personal and 
moral aspects must be submerged in order to create a justici-
able case or controversy (18). In fact, a patient's voice barely 
exists in court; instead, the medical experts and attorneys pre-
sent the patient's story through the prism of medical and legal 
knowledge. Consequently, the attorney's voice merges with the 
client's voice in such a way that the lawyer actually becomes 
the client. This accepted fiction is even documented in official 
court transcripts reporting that "Roe argued" or "Cruzan re-
futed" (20). Under this scheme, patients often feel unheard, 
because courts typically fail to address the patients' personal 
concerns, as Behuniak later demonstrates through the Su-
preme Court cases dealing with abortion and physician as-
sisted suicide. 
In Chapter Two, Behuniak focuses on the abortion cases, 
where she argues that medical and legal knowledge have been 
merged, while the personal knowledge of patients has been 
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pushed aside. She illustrates how the Court heard and ac-
cepted medical knowledge in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
Accordingly, the Court focused on the physicians' needs when 
deciding the case· rather than addressing the needs of women 
who seek abortions. Writing for the majority, Justice Black-
mun relied on his own independent medical knowledge to di-
vide a pregnancy into trimesters, and to describe the state's 
interests in terms of a three-part pregnancy (48). Thus, the 
majority opinion embraced medical fact, not only in the fram-
ing of abortion as a medical issue and in the deference given to 
medical expertise, but also in the structure of its holding. 
Behuniak's work goes on to chart the patterns that have 
emerged through the holdings in the abortion cases decided 
after Roe, in which the Court has clearly protected the physi-
cian-patient relationship and preserved the physician's discre-
tion. However, when government regulations have no legal 
bearing on physicians, they appear to be most often upheld, 
even where the restrictions impose real burdens on women 
seeking abortions (60). In perfect detail, Behuniak shows the 
disparate effects of providing medical knowledge a legal forum, 
while excluding patients' voices and their particularized 
knowledge. 
She perhaps best illustrates her theory that the Court fa-
vors medical knowledge over the patients' knowledge through 
an account taken from the oral arguments presented during 
Roe v. Wade. Jane Roe's attorney, Sarah Weddington, was in-
terrupted during her legal arguments regarding fetal person-
hood when the Court challenged her for failing to discuss the 
Hippocratic oath in her brief (44). Behuniak points out the 
special significance of the Court interrupting Weddington's le-
gal arguments to ask her about medical ethics. Earlier in the 
proceedings, Weddington had attempted to discuss the conse-
quences of pregnancy for women in order to show how the free-
dom to choose whether to terminate or carry out a pregnancy 
should be considered a fundamental right. At that point, Jus-
tice Stewart warned Weddington against result-oriented argu-
ments that veered into the "policy" arena (39). Somehow, the 
"medical knowledge was welcomed by the very legal norm that 
excluded patients' experiences as improperly result-oriented" 
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(44). By accepting and giving weight to both legal and scien-
tific knowledge, while rejecting the more subjective, emotional, 
and particular knowledge of the patients, the Court decided 
these abortion cases without hearing all of the available facts. 
Similarly, the physician assisted suicide cases discussed in 
Chapter Three also failed to make adequate use of patients' 
knowledge. Although attorneys introduced some of the pa-
tients' knowledge during oral arguments (88), only one amici 
brief presented the Court with personal stories illustrating the 
consequences that physician assisted suicide bans had on ter-
minally ill patients and their loved ones (87). The majority 
opinions in Washington u. Glucksberg, 138 L.Ed. 2d 772 (1997) 
and Vacco u. Quill, 138 L.Ed 2d 834 (1997) followed the tradi-
tional legal norms that guided the abortion decisions, again 
accepting legal and medical knowledge while casting aside the 
particular knowledge of the patients (91). 
However, Justice Stevens' concurrence in Glucksberg and 
Quill, and his dissent in Cruzan u. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) demonstrated that he ac-
tively listened for the patients' concerns. Justice Stevens 
seemed to understand that in the personal experiences of the 
dying patients, and contrary to medical knowledge, death is 
more than a physical event. To the patients, death is a process 
of losing themselves. Stevens also recognized that suffering 
includes more than just physical pain (96). Further, he ac-
knowledged that although alleviation of pain is medically pos-
sible, such treatments are not necessarily available to the suf-
fering patients who need them (98). While he voted with the 
majority in upholding the Washington and New York bans 
against physician assisted suicide, Justice Stevens still de-
parted from mainstream legal ideology by honoring the pa-
tients' personal experiences, even where they appeared to con-
tradict medical knowledge. 
In her .last two chapters, Behuniak builds on existing femi-
nist legal theory in articulating her proposal for a jurispru-
dence of care that would: first, place the patients and their con-
cerns at the center of the cases; second, fearlessly address cul-
tural and policy-oriented concerns; and third, call upon the 
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Court to find ways of including more particular, involved, and 
emotional knowledge in the judicial process. She applies this 
model to the abortion and physician assisted suicide cases to 
determine how a differently focused, more inclusive process 
might affect the outcome of the cases. However, Behuniak's 
analysis reveals that the kind of knowledge accepted by the 
Court also determines which facts will be given weight and 
whose concerns the Justices choose to address in their opinions. 
It is in these final chapters that Behuniak introduces us to the 
voices of the patients, which had previously been muffied by 
the traditional notions of justice that govern our legal system. 
In formulating her model for a caring jurisprudence, Be-
huniak incorporates a variety of sources suitable to the task 
she has set out for herself. More specifically, her sources span 
the range from drama (Brian Clark's play, Whose Life Is It 
Anyway? and Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice) and song 
("Amazing Grace") to books exploring the meaning and process 
of death, such as How We Die (1993) by Sherwin B. Nuland, 
and On Death and Dying (1969) by Elizabeth Kubler-Ross. In 
illustrating her core themes, Behuniak even finds ways to en-
list a sculpture of Lady Justice with the Angel of Mercy and a 
guidebook on tapestry weaving. Although she relies heavily on 
feminist theory, she also makes sure to include the voices of the 
patients themselves, taken from letters, journals, autobiogra-
phies, and trial briefs. The patients' personal stories, which 
are scattered throughout the book, take center stage in Be-
huniak's final chapters. In this way, the reader becomes wit-
ness to the same kind of intensely personal knowledge that the 
Court might hear under Behuniak's model of jurisprudence, 
wherein justice is truly tempered with compassion and pa-
tients' concerns are directly addressed. 
A Caring Jurisprudence is structurally sound in that Be-
huniak frequently summarizes where she has been in her ar-
gument and maps out where she is going next. Although it 
might be criticized as unnecessarily repetitive, this stylistic 
choice works to enhance Behuniak's arguments by cementing 
each new addition to the foundation she is building before the 
next argument is laid out. In so doing, she creates a solid 
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framework that can be easily extended to other areas of the 
law. 
Ultimately, Behuniak issues nothing short of a formal chal-
lenge for others to continue where she leaves off (120). 
Through the careful refrain of her common themes, it becomes 
possible to envision how her model for a more caring jurispru-
dence can be applied in legal settings other than the biomedical 
cases she explores here. Her book is an important addition to 
feminist legal scholarship, which could effectively serve as a 
supplementary text in any law school classroom where modern 
constitutional theory or feminist jurisprudence is taught. Be-
yond that, the book provides a methodology to support and en-
courage judges in finding better ways to temper justice with 
compassion by inviting personal stories and voices into the ju-
dicial process. 
Kim Harvey * 
* J.D. 2000 Golden Gate University School of Law; B.F.A., Theatre, Virginia 
Commonwealth University. 
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